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Abstract 
 
The amorphous landscape of Internet technology and modern music 
sharing allows music listeners to instantly access new works from different 
artists at any location across the globe.  Entities like YouTube have developed 
server space to lend to users who upload digital music and stream the content 
for public enjoyment.  SoundCloud, a service founded in 2007 and based in 
Berlin, Germany 1, has expanded upon this concept by encouraging its users 
to create their own works of audio artistry and upload these works to share 
with others.  The facilitation of sharing works through SoundCloud has let it 
become perhaps the most popular music sharing platforms today. 
The most significant problem faced by SoundCloud, along with similar 
service providers that have followed suit, is that, along with original works 
that the service was initially intended for, a wealth of copyrighted material is 
uploaded and shared by and amongst its users. 2  Intensifying the problem, 
the platform’s promotion of sharing the new works has allowed users, and 
perhaps encouraged them, to freely upload musical creations that are often 
derivative works of copyrighted materials (i.e. samples, remixes, and edits of 
copyrighted tracks).  The design of the platform complicates the task of 
                                                        
1  SoundCloud Review, APP APPEAL, http://www.appappeal.com/app/soundcloud 
2  See Jing Xu, DMCA Safe Harbors and the Future of New Digital Music Sharing Platforms, 11 
Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 145; see also Ryan Tranzmission, Copyright Wars: Tranzmission vs. Interpol vs. 
SoundCloud, TRANZMISSION, http://www.thetranzmission.com/2010/08/copyright-wars-
tranzmission-vs-interpol.html (reporting a SoundCloud request to remove a track the author believed 
he obtained permission to upload).) 
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separating songs that have been altered enough to constitute a new work, or 
transformational use of a copyrighted work, from those that may have been 
minimally altered—hiding the fact that a particular song is copyrighted.  
SoundCloud’s challenge has become identifying the use of the platform that 
may give rise to copyright infringement while still allowing the free-flow of 
presenting and sharing non-infringing music. 
To detect uses of its service that constitute infringement, SoundCloud 
has implemented the use of Audible Magic, a “fingerprinting technology” that 
can automatically identify copyrighted works as they are uploaded onto a 
user’s page through the service. 3  However, Audible Magic is an inconsistent 
technology. 4   Most deliberate copies of copyrighted songs are removed 
consistently, as the audio recognition software accurately identifies songs that 
have not been altered in any way. 5  Nonetheless, problems arise when the 
technology attempts to analyze remixes, samples, and edits of copyrighted 
materials.  Some of these altered songs are successfully identified and 
removed, while other alterations of the same song are not detected by Audible 
Magic’s algorithms and remain available. 6  This has led to situations where 
                                                        
3  Eamonn Forde, SoundCloud Partners with Audible Magic for Rights Identification, MUSICWEEK 
(Jan. 5, 2011, 10:05 
AM), http://www.musicweek.com/story.asp?storyCode=1043741&sectioncode=1. 
4  See Scott Smitelli, Fun with YouTube 's Audio Content ID System, COMPUTER SCIENCE 
HOUSE (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.csh.rit.edu/~parallax/ (finding that "any pitch or time alterations 
will also work [to override Audible Magic], provided you apply a 6% or greater change to the 
parameter you are adjusting"). 
5  See Technology Overview, AUDIBLE MAGIC, http://audiblemagic.com/technology.php 
(detailing how Audible Magic identifies unless the user is solely purchasing extra server space to store 
and share snippets of audio files and then matches the sound clip with a database containing more 
than 11 million copyrighted songs). 
6  Id. 
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users whose works are flagged for infringement have found that other works 
with seemingly equal levels of infringement remain unflagged.  The presence 
of these works that have slipped through the fingertips of the fingerprinting 
technology reside in the grey area of copyright law 7 and have been the 
subject of litigation brought by copyright holders against SoundCloud. 
There has been a hotly contested debate in the field of copyright law as 
to whether SoundCloud’s platform, and other similar service providers, by 
design, gives rise to a prima facie case for copyright infringement.  This debate 
calls for the examination of Digital Millennium Copyright Act 8 (“DMCA”) safe 
harbor provisions, the implications of these provisions, as well as possible fair 
use defenses as they apply to the innovative functionality of SoundCloud.  This 
begs the question of whether the current growth of the platform can be 
sustained without having to sacrifice the original creative utility provided to 
its end-users. 
 
  
                                                        
7  See Tonya M. Evans, Sampling, Looping, and Mashing . . . Oh My!: How Hip Hop Music Is 
Scratching More Than the Surface of Copyright Law, EXPRESSO, 3 (2011) (discussing a circuit split 
over the fair use status of remixes), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=tonya_evans. 
8  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05. 
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I.  SoundCloud’s Innovative Platform 
 
 SoundCloud’s innovative platform integrates a unique feature that 
creates visual representations of sound, allows playback and the optional 
ability to download audio files, and encourages users to provide feedback and 
interact with other users at specific points throughout the visual waveform (a 
waveform player is one that visualizes sound). 9  SoundCloud offers a free 
service to the public but also generates revenue through user subscriptions. 
Revenue is generated by the service by using a tiered subscription model with 
no advertisements. 10   Because of the subscription model, SoundCloud’s 
revenue stream does not suffer as much from the use of Audible Magic as an 
ad-based model would. 11  With SoundCloud’s subscription model, regardless 
of infringing material, users will still pay the initial signup fee because utility 
remains to be derived from legitimate uses of service. 12 
 
A.  Features 
 SoundCloud’s software takes an audio file and, during an upload from a 
user, generates a visual representation of the audio file’s sound.  By creating 
a “waveform” map, other users can identify a specific moment or section of 
                                                        
9  Your Sound, in the Player, SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/tour/ 
10  Eliot Van Buskirk, SoundCloud Threatens MySpace as Music Destination for Twitter 
Era, WIRED (Jul. 6, 2009, 5:20 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/07/soundcloud-threatens-
myspace-as-music-destination-for-twitter-era. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
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the music that is of particular interest to them. 13  This visualization gives 
users an alternative conceptualization of a track’s production, allowing them 
to note where a particular section begins or ends and how sounds are amassed 
to produce the final piece. 14   Users can also leave personal comments, 
suggestions, or feedback that visually represents itself at specific points in the 
waveform, creating potential back-and-forth communication between users. 
15 
 The unique ability to display the waveform of any given uploaded track 
while receiving continuous feedback from other music aficionados makes 
SoundCloud a particularly appealing platform for new artists who are trying to 
build a network of fans, fellow musicians, and potential collaborators. 16  It is 
also a useful service to more established producers and DJs, who are 
constantly looking for new ways to quickly distribute material to widespread 
audiences. 17  SoundCloud’s interactive features help to manifest a feeling of 
personal investment in others’ artistry, which strengthens the sense of 
community among users in any particular genre of music.  The waveforms are 
also easily embedded on popular blog sites 18 and directly into Facebook and 
                                                        
13  Your Sound, in the Player, supra note 10. 
14  See, e.g., Jon Charnis, EG AFTER.011 SOUNDCLOUD, https://soundcloud.com/egpodcast/eg-
after011-jon-charnis (depicting visually where sound buildup occurs and entering breaks to signify a 
change in the momentum of the song). 
15  Id. 
16  See Van Buskirk, supra note 11 (noting that artists can quickly share improvements and 
thoughts on new music). 
17  See id. (emphasizing SoundCloud's connection to social media services such as Facebook and 
Twitter). 
18  See id. (explaining that SoundCloud creates a unique URL for each of an artist's tracks, which 
allows them to embed the music elsewhere). 
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Twitter posts. 19  SoundCloud also offers a free mobile application that notifies 
users of recently uploaded material, recent user interactions, and other 
information that users may find exciting. 20  With regard to privacy settings, 
users have a range of autonomy—from opting to allow a file to be 
downloadable, to opting to keep a file private and shared with only selected 
users. 21 
 True to its mantra, through these interactive features, SoundCloud “puts 
your sound at the heart of communities, websites and even apps.” 22  A user 
can watch conversations, connections and social experiences happen through 
the medium of sharing music. 23   It is this call to personal creativity, 
collaboration, and musical innovation along with no file-size limitations and 
customizable sharing options, that separates this platform from other similar 
services. 24  Intrinsically, and ironically, it is because of these unique features, 
together with the service’s emphasis on “your sound,” that the uploader often 
assumes that they own the audio files.  The problematic presence of infringing 
                                                        
19  David Noël, Updated Facebook Application, SOUNDCLOUD BLOG (Jan. 15, 
2010), http://blog.soundcloud.com/2010/01/15/facebook/. 
20  Mike Ziarko, SoundCloud Social Music Community Lets You Visually Comment On 
Music, SOCIAL TIMES (Dec. 15, 2010, 3:45 PM), http://www.socialtimes.com/2010/12/soundcloud-
social-music-community-lets-you-visually-comment-on-music/. 
21  SoundCloud Review, supra note 1. 
22  SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/ (last visited Dec. 05, 2016). 
23  Id. 
24  Van Buskirk, supra note 11 ("In a few short months SoundCloud has begun to give [social 
media platforms] a run for the hearts and minds of recording artists eager to interact more nimbly 
with fans than is possible on [these giant social networks]."). 
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material remains pervasive because of the essence of this ubiquitous 
misnomer. 25 
 
B. Monetization Model 
 
 SoundCloud has more than 175 million unique monthly listeners (as of 
January 2016). 26  The expansion of the platform into mobile applications for 
iPhone and Android users has caused exponential increase in the service’s 
user base. 27  Through this growth, SoundCloud found opportunities to identify 
high value and low value users.  The differentiation allowed SoundCloud to 
monetize its increasing user base by providing a variety of accounts, 
incorporating both free and paid service options. 28  The free service provides 
the basic waveform tools, but caps the number of uploadable minutes. 29  
Accounts are then available to access additional features that are available at 
different service tiers available at increasing prices depending on the tier. 30  
Users can access more hours for uploads, more efficient distribution channels, 
and greater recognition for their uploads, depending on the price of the 
                                                        
25  Tranzmission, supra note 3 (detailing a request to remove a track thought to be uploaded 
with permission). 
26  See SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/; see also Alex Moazed, Why SoundCloud Will Be 
Worth More Than Spotify, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 24, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/01/24/why-
soundcloud-will-be-worth-more-than-spotify/ (comparing SoundCloud to YouTube while likening 
Spotify’s service to Netflix) 
27  SoundCloud Reaches Three Million User Mark, NME (Feb. 11, 2011, 1:43 PM), 
http://www.nme.com/news/various-artists/54934, supra note 29. 
28  See SoundCloud Premium, SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/premium/ 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
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service. 31  Each account has limitations that can only be lifted by purchasing 
a better plan. 32  There is no third party advertising at any account level, but 
the appeal of the premium accounts is the unlimited uploading, adjustable 
privacy settings and unlimited contacts. 33 
 
C. Audible Magic Identification Technology 
 
 Since 2011, SoundCloud has used Audible Magic’s content identification 
technology 34 to identify the upload of copyrighted material in a database 
containing millions of songs. 35 Due to SoundCloud’s revenue model, which is 
tied to offering heightened services in return for compensation as opposed to 
the quantity of views per a user’s page, Audible Magic’s prevention of 
infringing material does not hurt SoundCloud’s profitability as it would a site 
such as YouTube. 36 Users that are inclined to use SoundCloud’s server space 
to distribute infringing material would be unlikely to pay monthly for premium 
service. 37 Users that consistently and knowingly uploaded infringing material 
would reasonably choose to use a free account.  Such users have no need to 
pay for extra features when free accounts already allow for the private link 
                                                        
31  Id. 
32  Help/Premium & Billing, SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/help/premium-accounts 
33  Van Buskirk, supra note 11. 
34  Forde, supra note 4. 
35  Technology Overview, supra note 6. 
36  See Michael Rappa, Business Models on the Web, DIGITAL ENTERPRISE 
(2010), http://digitalenterprise.org/models/models.html (advertising models work best when the 
volume of viewer traffic is large and subscription fees are incurred irrespective of actual usage rate). 
37  Id. 
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sharing and download options.  By the same token, premium users, such as 
well known DJs or producers, are blocked from uploading music deemed by 
the identification technology to be infringing, however that unutilized upload 
time could still be used to upload non-infringing material.  These professionals 
are the type of users that SoundCloud had originally intended to attract.  
However, in a way, the attraction of premium users may be coming to an end. 
38 
 Audible Magic has proven itself problematic, despite the progressive 
nature of this technology.  Tests have shown that basic audial manipulation of 
a copyrighted track (i.e. remixed or samples with no intention to avoid Audible 
Magic’s detection) will fool the algorithm. 39  Although SoundCloud encourages 
users to borrow and modify content, Audible Magic fails to catch many uploads 
that infringe on copyrights. 40  The issue for SoundCloud is that its target 
market is comprised of DJs, producers, and remixers, all of whom frequently 
borrow and sample from copyrighted material. 41  These users experience 
notoriety through the sharing of such remixed music on SoundCloud, leading 
                                                        
38  See Miles Raymer, SoundCloud Raining on Its Own Parade, CHICAGO READER (Mar. 3, 
2011), http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/sharp-darts-soundcloud-
copyright/Content?oid=3351152 (noting that "DJs were the early adopters that helped [SoundCloud] 
reach critical mass," but they are feeling betrayed by recent practices that "appear to defer to rights 
holders"). 
39  See Smitelli, supra note 5 (finding that the algorithm only recognizes a sound clip if it is a 
certain length, while changes in pitch, tempo, or background white noise may successfully cloak the 
clip). 
40  See Larisa Mann, Walling Off Another Garden: Is Soundcloud Turning on Its 
Supporters?, RIPLEY (Dec. 25, 2010), http://djripley.blogspot.com/2010/12/walling-off-another-
garden-is.html (positing that much of the content on SoundCloud would be considered infringing 
material). 
41  Id. 
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to an erroneous belief that no legal repercussions exist due to uploading 
potentially infringing content.  Therefore, a significant number of infringing 
files are successfully uploaded to SoundCloud’s servers 42 but are not removed 
without the copyright holder’s express search and notice action. 43 
 
  
                                                        
42  See Evans, supra note 8, at 3 (discussing the circuit split over whether remixes of 
copyrighted songs are still illegal). 
43  Mann, supra note 44 (Copyright holders may file a takedown notice for an upload that they 
believe to be infringing. The service provider is required to remove the accused upload even if the 
copyright holder presents no evidence that it is actually infringing. The uploader may then file a 
counter-notice that would force the copyright holder to provide proof.) 
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II. DMCA § 512(c) Safe Harbor Provision 
 
To avoid liability, SoundCloud should comprise a strategy pursuant to 
the Viacom v. YouTube decision. 44  The prevalent presence of arguably illegal 
work on SoundCloud’s servers may incite major record labels or other rights 
holders to sue. 45  With an understanding of the court’s decision in YouTube, 
SoundCloud, along with other similar service providers, can better understand 
the implications of the DMCA § 512(c) safe harbor, while foreseeing how to 
best position themselves for protection. 46 
 
A.  The YouTube Decision’s Interpretation of DMCA Safe Harbors 
1.  Relevant § 512 provisions 
Section 512(c)(1) of the DMCA provides that a service provider will not 
be liable for storing copyright-infringing material if the service provider: (a) 
“does not have actual knowledge that the material or activity using the 
material on the system is infringing”; (b) “in the absence of such knowledge, 
is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent”; or (c) “upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
                                                        
44  Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 940 F.Supp.2d 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
45  Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that copyright 
holder was suing YouTube over "tens of thousands of videos [that] were taken unlawfully" (quoting 
Brief for Viacom, at 1)). 
46  See generally Cassius Sims, A Hypothetical Non-Infringing Network: An Examination of the 
Efficacy of Safe Harbor in Section 512(c) of the DMCA, 2009 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 9 (2009) (detailing 
the various elements of DMCA Section 512(c) and the standards by which service providers might 
qualify for protection). 
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expeditiously to remove, or disable access to the material.” 47  Additionally, 
the service provider cannot have received “a financial benefit directly 
attributable to the infringing material” if the service provider “has the right 
and ability to control such activity.” 48  Finally, § 512(c)(1)(C) requires the 
service provider, when notified of a claimed infringement by the copyright 
holder, to quickly “remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed 
to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.” 49 
 Section 512(c)(2) and (3) set forth the necessary steps to satisfy the 
notification requirement, and include the service provider’s designation of an 
agent to receive notices, as well as which information the notice needs to 
provide. 50  Section 512(m) expressly provides that the § 512(c) safe harbor 
is not predicated on “(1) a service provider monitoring its service or 
affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity, except to the extent 
consistent … with the provisions of subsection (i)” or “(2) a service provider 
gaining access to, removing, or disabling access to material in cases in which 
such conduct is prohibited by law.” 51  Instead, § 512(i) requires a qualifying 
service provider to implement a system that “provides for the termination in 
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders … who are 
                                                        
47  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C §§ 512(c)(1) 
48  Id. 
49  Id. 
50  YouTube, 718 F.Supp.2d 514, 517-18. 
51  Id. at 518. 
 14 
repeat infringers.” 52   Additionally, service providers must also 
“accommodate[e] and … not interfere with standard technical measures.” 53 
 In Youtube, the court identified a critical question with regard to 
YouTube’s qualification for the DMCA safe harbor. 54   This question was 
whether the “actual knowledge” and “facts or circumstances from which 
infringing activity is apparent” language in § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) required a 
general awareness by YouTube of infringements, or, rather, required the 
higher standard of “actual or constructive knowledge of specific and 
identifiable infringements of individual items.” 55  The court held that the high 
standard of actual or constructive knowledge was required. 56 
 
2.  Legislative History 
 Concerning the DMCA, the Senate and House Reports demonstrated 
Congress’ dual concerns of providing an effective deterrence method to clear 
and repeated cases of infringement while simultaneously ensuring that these 
methods were not overly burdensome for service providers. 57  One of the 
concerns that led to the creation of the safe harbor was to protect important 
                                                        
52  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1). 
53  Id. 
54  YouTube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 519. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. at 520. 
57  See id. at 522-23 (discussing § 512(d)—which deals with information location tools—
elaborating on specificity requirements as well as "red flag" cases of infringement involving "pirate" 
sites that lead service providers to a greater likelihood of awareness of infringement in the absence of 
actual knowledge.  Also discussing the purpose of the safe harbor to "promote the development" of 
service providers like Yahoo! as long as they follow the notice and takedown requirements). 
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service providers from having to implement practices that would be 
impractical to execute on a large scale. 58  In YouTube, the court initially 
examined the text of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report, and 
stated that the overarching purpose of the DMCA was to “ensure that the 
efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and 
quality of the services on the Internet will continue to expand.” 59  Further, 
the court examined the Senate Judiciary Committee Report and the House 
Committee on Commerce Report to clarify § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)’s “actual 
knowledge” language. 60  The court defined actual knowledge as “actual or 
constructive knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements.” 61  Finally, 
the court examined the Reports regarding how to approach the § 
512(c)(1)(A)(ii) “red flag” test, which provides direction on how to know that 
an “infringing activity is apparent.” 62 
 On the passage of the DMCA, the House and Senate Reports describe § 
512(c)(1)(A)(ii) as a “red flag” test which requires “both a subjective and an 
objective element.” 63  The test’s subjective element involves a determination 
of the “awareness of the service provider of the facts or circumstances in 
                                                        
58  See id. at 523 (discussing § 512(d) and its proscription that "awareness of infringement . . . 
should typically be imputed to a directory provider only with respect to pirate sites or in similarly 
obvious and conspicuous circumstances"). 
59  Id. at 519. 
60  Id. at 519-23. 
61  The court ruled that "actual knowledge" means "actual or constructive knowledge of specific 
and identifiable infringements." 
62  Id. 
63  Id. at 520. 
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question.” 64  The objective element is then used to determine “whether those 
facts or circumstances constitute a “red flag”—in other words, whether 
infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating 
under the same or similar circumstances.” 65 
 The YouTube court also examined the Reports’ comparison between the 
§ 512(d) provision’s “need for specificity” when dealing with information 
location tools like Yahoo! and the § 512(c) provisions. 66  The Reports state 
that under the “actual knowledge” and “not aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent” language, a service provider has no 
obligation to seek out copyright infringement. 67  However, a service provider 
would not qualify to benefit from the safe harbor if it “had turned a blind eye 
to ‘red flags’ of obvious infringement.” 68  The court elaborated that absent 
such red flags or actual knowledge, a directory provider cannot be reasonably 
expected to know whether content is infringing from a “brief cataloguing visit.” 
69  This test was made to strike the right balance for online editors and 
cataloguers, as it is unreasonable to require them to “make discriminating 
judgments about potential copyright infringement” unless the case is 
“obviously pirate.” 70 
                                                        
64  Id. 
65  Id. at 520-21. 
66  Id. at 522. 
67  Id. 
68  See id. (explaining an example of a clear red flag where a directory provider came across a 
"pirate" site that allowed downloading of copyrighted material). 
69  Id. 
70  Id. at 523. 
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 Therefore, a high level of certainty of repeated infringement is required 
before the name of the party or site can be qualified as a “red flag”.71  In 
considering policy, the court reasoned that information location tools are 
essential to the operation of the Internet. 72  Therefore, requiring a higher 
standard for human judgment and discretion, when the legal question is 
already complicated as it is, would have a chilling effect on whether directory 
providers are willing to continuously catalogue potentially infringing material. 
73   This conclusion suggests that the court seemed to be guided by the 
utilitarian concept of potential societal loss outweighing the copyright holders’ 
actual loss. 
 YouTube applied a similar utilitarian reasoning to service providers as 
well. 74  With regard to efficiency, the court reasoned that rights holders 
themselves were in the best position to identify infringing material and 
determent whether they wanted to stop an infringing action. 75   After 
analyzing further commentary on other § 512 provisions, the court concluded 
that the intentions of the DMCA were not to force service providers like 
YouTube to affirmatively seek “facts indicating infringing activity” in order to 
qualify for safe harbor protection. 76 
                                                        
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  See id. at 524 (reasoning that the amount of infringing material on a service provider's 
servers may be insignificant and the copyright owner or licensor is in the best position to determine if 
they actually want to fight a case of infringement). 
76  Id. 
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 The House and Senate Reports also provided clarification regarding how 
to apply § 512(c)(1)(B), the provision that bars service providers from 
receiving a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.  The 
court stated that in a determination as to whether the financial benefit 
criterion is satisfied, “courts should take a common-sense, fact-based 
approach, not a formalistic one.” 77  Generally, this means that a service 
provider conducting a legitimate business would not be considered to receive 
a “financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity” where the 
infringer makes the same kind of payment as non-infringing users of the 
provider’s service. 78  For example, “receiving a one-time set-up fee and flat 
periodic payments for service from a person engaging in infringing activities 
would not constitute receiving a ‘financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity.’” 79  This analysis is a particularly relevant consideration 
when trying to understand whether SoundCloud’s particular monetization 
model is relevant under § 512(c)(1)(B). 80 
 
3. Case Law 
In YouTube, the court emphasized that the outcome of the case turned 
on how specific the § 512(c)(1)(A) “actual knowledge” requirement was, and 
what kind of “awareness” of infringement was expected from service 
                                                        
77  Id. at 521. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  See infra, Part II.B.2. 
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providers. 81   The court ultimately held that “general knowledge” that 
infringement is “ubiquitous” does not impose a duty on the service provider 
to monitor or search its services for infringement. 82  The court reached this 
conclusion after examining previous cases that, while not binding precedent 
on the court, used a line of reasoning that applied to providers that were 
comparable in size and function to YouTube. 83 
 The court drew justification for its interpretation from Tiffany Inc. v. 
eBay 84 , which involved a claim of contributory liability for trademark 
infringement. 85  In eBay, the court held that Tiffany needed to show that eBay 
knew of “specific instances of actual infringement,” and had more than a 
“generalized notice” that some portion of the Tiffany goods sold on its website 
“might be counterfeit.” 86  In drawing parallels between YouTube and eBay, 
the court decided that, through the DMCA, Congress intended the copyright 
holder to bear the burden of identifying specific instances of infringement. 87  
Therefore, without a showing that YouTube knew of specific infringing material 
                                                        
81  Amanda Bronstad, 'Viacom v. YouTube' Appeal May Decide Future of Web, LTN L. TECH. 
NEWS (Dec 14, 2010), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleFriendlyLTN.jsp?id=1202476144090&slreturn=
1&hbxlogin=1. 
82  Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 525. 
83  See id. at 524 (explaining that if the identification of cases of infringement required an 
investigation of "facts and circumstances," then those cases did not constitute "red flags," and 
explaining that a "blatant" showing of infringement was necessary to prove that Amazon had actual 
knowledge of infringement by its users). 
84  Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir 2010). 
85  Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 525. 
86  Id. (quoting Tiffany, 600 F.3d 93 at 106-07). 
87  See id. (explaining that although Tiffany did not involve the DMCA, the DMCA applies the 
same principle: without a "red flag" or notice from the owner of specific instances of infringement, the 
service provider is not obligated to identify the infringement). 
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that was not quickly removed, Viacom could not win its case by invoking § 
512(c)(1)(A). 88 
 With respect to the § 512(c)(1)(B) “financial benefit” requirement, 
Viacom argued that YouTube received ad revenue which was directly 
attributable to the infringing content at issue. 89   The court examined § 
512(c)(1)(B)’s “right and ability to control” language and reasoned that 
knowledge proceeds control. 90  The court reasoned that 512(c)(1)(B) requires 
“the provider must know of the particular case before he can control it.” 91  
Because it is the burden of the copyright holder to notify YouTube of specific 
cases of infringement, YouTube virtually never “controls” infringing material 
without having first received notice from the owner. 92  Having received notice 
and promptly removing the infringing material, the court found that YouTube 
had by all accounts acted in good faith and in compliance with the DMCA 
guidelines for quick removal, and could therefore not be held liable for 
infringement. 93 
 In August 2011, the appeal was argued before the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and a decision was issued on April 5, 2012. 
                                                        
88  See id. ("[I]f a service provider knows . . . of specific instances of infringement, the provider 
must promptly remove the infringing material. If not, the burden is on the owner to identify the 
infringement. General knowledge that infringement is 'ubiquitous' does not impose a duty on the 
service provider to monitor or search its service for infringements."). 
89  Id. at 527. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. 
92  See id. ("[T]he provider must know of the particular case [of infringement] before he can 
control it."). 
93  See id. at 524 (explaining that after receiving notice of over 100,000 infringing videos from 
Viacom, YouTube "had removed virtually all of them" by the next business day). 
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94  The court of appeals determined that the district court correctly held that 
§ 512(c)(1)(A) requires knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances 
that indicate specific and identifiable instances of infringement. 95  However, 
the district court’s order granting summary judgment to YouTube was vacated 
because the court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that YouTube 
had knowledge or awareness under § 512(c)(1)(A) at least with respect to a 
handful of specific clips. 96  The court also held that the willful blindness 
doctrine may apply, in appropriate circumstances, to demonstrate knowledge 
or awareness of specific instances of infringement. 97 
Further, the appellate court found that the district court erred by 
requiring “item-specific” knowledge of infringing activity under § 
512(c)(1)(B), and the judgment was reversed insofar as it rested on that 
erroneous construction of the statute. 98  The appellate court affirmed the 
district court’s holding that three of the challenged YouTube software 
functions, replication, playback, and the related videos feature, occur “by 
reason of the storage at the direction of a user” within the meaning of § 
512(c)(1); however it remanded the cause for further fact-finding regarding 
                                                        
94  Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) 
95  Id. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. at 24 
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a fourth software function, involving the syndication of YouTube videos to third 
parties. 99 
 The court of appeals set forth the following issues to be examined on 
remand: (1) Whether YouTube had knowledge or awareness of any specific 
infringements; (2) Whether YouTube willfully blinded itself to specific 
infringements; (3) Whether YouTube had the “right and ability to control” 
infringing activity within the meaning of § 512(c)(1)(B); (4) Whether any 
clips-in-suit were syndicated to a third party and, if so, whether such 
syndication occurred “by reason of the storage at the direction of the user” 
within the meaning of § 512(c)(1), so that YouTube may claim the protection 
of the § 512(c) safe harbor. 100 
 On April 18, 2013, the district court issued another order granting 
summary judgment in favor of YouTube. 101  Following the remand from the 
Second Circuit court of appeals, the district judge ruled on all four issues in 
his decision. 102  The court ruled in favor of YouTube on all four issues finding 
that YouTube had no actual knowledge of any specific instance of infringement 
of Viacom’s works, and therefore could not have “willfully blinded itself” to the 
infringement. 103  The court also found that YouTube did not have the “right 
and ability to control” infringing activity because “there [was] no evidence that 
                                                        
99  Id. 
100  Id. 
101  Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 940 F.Supp.2d 110 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
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YouTube induced its users to submit infringing videos, provided users with 
detailed instruction about what content to upload or edited their content, 
prescreened submissions for quality, steered users to infringing videos, or 
otherwise interacted with infringing users to a point where it might be said to 
have participated in their activity.” 104  This ruling came despite statements 
made by YouTube employees that “[we should grow] as aggressively as we 
can through whatever tactics, however evil … [the site is] out of control with 
copyrighted material … [if we remove] the obviously copyright infringing stuff 
… site traffic [would] drop to maybe 205 … steal it!” 105  Notably, YouTube 
successfully argued that these quotations were taken out of context. 
 Subsequent to the district court’s holding, an appeal had begun, but 
prior to the parties’ second appearance before the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, a settlement was announced, and it was reported that no money was 
exchanged.106 
 
B.  Application of § 512(c) to SoundCloud 
                                                        
104  Docket Alarm, Inc. (April 18, 2013), (“Granting Defendant YouTube’s Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment; Entering Judgment that Defendants are Protected by the Safe-Harbor Provisions 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) from all of Plaintiffs Copyright Infringement 
Claims”), https://www.docketalarm.com/cases/New_York_Southern_District_Court/1--07-cv-
02103/Viacom_International_Inc._et_al_v._Youtube_Inc._et_al/452/ 
105  Docket Alarm, Inc. (Black Entertainment Television, LLC, Comedy Partners, Country Music 
Television, Inc., Paramount Pictures Corporation, Viacom International, Inc. (March 29, 2013), 
“Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment”), 
https://www.docketalarm.com/cases/New_York_Southern_District_Court/1--07-cv-
02103/Viacom_International_Inc._et_al_v._Youtube_Inc._et_al/446/ 
106  Jonathan Stempel, “Google, Viacom settle landmark YouTube lawsuit”, (March 18, 2014), 
REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-viacom-lawsuit-idUSBREA2H11220140318  
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 Using the YouTube court’s guidelines for applying § 512(c) to service 
providers, SoundCloud and other similar platforms should fall under the DMCA 
safe harbor.  In turn, the DMCA safe harbor limits their potential liability for 
infringing material uploaded to their servers.  As a company, SoundCloud 
should consider relevant arguments that were made against YouTube to 
appropriately protect itself. 107 
 
1.  § 512(c)(1)(A) 
 The YouTube court’s interpretation of “actual knowledge” requires 
SoundCloud to have knowledge of “specific and identifiable infringements of 
particular items” beyond the “mere knowledge of prevalence of such activity 
in general.” 108  Here, SoundCloud does not directly monitor uploads.  Rather, 
it utilizes the Audible Magic technology to preemptively stop infringement.  In 
a potential suit, an argument on behalf of rights holders that SoundCloud has 
“actual knowledge” is likely to be unsuccessful. Assuming arguendo, if the title 
of an uploaded song somehow indicated that the song could potentially 
infringe a copyright, 109 it would not constitute actual knowledge under the 
court’s ruling.  For example, an artist of a remix might secure a license from 
                                                        
107  Cf. Mike Masnick, YouTube 's Reply In Viacom Case Demolishes Each of Viacom's Key 
Arguments, TECHDIRT (Apr. 1, 2011, 7:48 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110401/02080513719/youtubes-reply-viacom-case-demolishes-
each-viacoms-key-arguments.shtml (describing YouTube's response to Viacom's appeal). 
108  Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 523. 
109  Such potential infringement might, for instance, be identified as a remix of a top pop song 
appearing on SoundCloud's "Hot" list. See, e.g., Explore Tracks, 
SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/tracks (last visited Dec. 4, 2016). 
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the original musician but a SoundCloud employee would not have knowledge 
of such license without further inquiry. 
To satisfy the actual knowledge standard, a plaintiff would have to show 
that SoundCloud knew the song is infringing.  If the song passes the Audible 
Magic filter, showing actual knowledge requires SoundCloud to proactively 
contact the presumed rights holder.  Arguably, such a requirement extends to 
the type of “investigative duties” that the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 v. Google 
110 attempted to discourage. 111  Therefore, the actual knowledge requirement 
would be difficult to prove. 
 Section 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) sets forth a more challenging hurdle for 
SoundCloud to overcome.  This subsection sets forth the inquiry of whether 
SoundCloud, “is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing 
activity is apparent,” and the “red flag” test used to verify it. 112   The 
controlling question will be whether any red flags objectively exist on 
SoundCloud’s servers.  In other words, “whether infringing activities would 
have been apparent to a reasonable person” in the “same or similar 
circumstances” as one of SoundCloud’s employees. 113  This analysis involves 
both an objective and subjective component.  Even if infringing material can 
objectively be identified as a red flag, the subjective element still exists, 
requiring a determination of how aware SoundCloud is of these red flags.  
                                                        
110  Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007). 
111  See Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 524 (quoting Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1114). 
112  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
113  Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 520-21. 
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Awareness is easier to prove if the infringing material is highly visible or if the 
artists themselves are highly visible—for example, the content available on 
the SoundCloud “Explore Tracks” page. 114  If an obviously infringing track 
bypassed the Audible Magic filter, and became popular enough to reach such 
a heightened level of exposure, then SoundCloud would be required to remove 
that content under § 512(c)(a)(A)(iii). 
 The DMCA’s legislative history indicates that it is “not possible to identify 
a uniform time limit for expeditious action,” due to “factual circumstances” 
and “technical parameters” that vary on a case by case basis. 115  When 
SoundCloud receives specific knowledge of infringing material, it is usually 
through a copyright holder’s notice, at which point SoundCloud acts quickly to 
send out takedown notices immediately, in accordance with § 512(c)(A)(iii). 
116  Considering that the statute is flexible enough to apply case-specific 
determinations when deciding the appropriate time limit, the promptness of 
SoundCloud’s response is likely to satisfy the “expeditious action” requirement 
expounded in YouTube.  Echoing YouTube’s procedural safeguards against 
infringement should allow SoundCloud to defeat a § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) 
challenge. 
 
2.  § 512(c)(1)(B) 
                                                        
114  See Explore Tracks, supra note 98 (listing the "Hot" and "Latest" tracks). 
115  Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 521. 
116  See Mann, supra note 44 (discussing how producers often complain about having remixes 
taken down due to copyright complaints). 
 27 
 SoundCloud’s business model can be used to eliminate the financial 
benefit that the company receives from the presence of infringing materials 
on its servers.  The way that the DMCA’s legislative history treats service 
providers that require a “one-time set-up fee and flat periodic payments” 
favorably supports the conclusion that SoundCloud meets the § 512(c)(1)(B) 
requirement. 117  SoundCloud benefits from the application of the YouTube 
court’s ruling that “control” is not possible without specific knowledge and that 
the DMCA does not place the burden on the provider to proactively seek 
specific knowledge of infringing uploads. 
Contrarily, a copyright holder may argue that, by allowing its users to 
upload and download songs in greater quantities according to the increase in 
payment by a user, SoundCloud has created a distinguishable feature that 
incentivizes paying for premium accounts, therefore violating § 512(c)(1)(B).  
However, this argument is necessarily premised on the proposition that 
SoundCloud’s limit on uploading and downloading for free accounts is a 
purposeful institution.  SoundCloud would have to be both aware of infringing 
material uploaded to its servers, and want users to purchase higher level 
accounts in order to upload with fewer restrictions.  SoundCloud should not 
be too concerned with § 512(c)(1)(B) as this is a difficult argument to support 
with probative evidence. 
 
                                                        
117  See Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 521. 
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3.  §512(c)(1)(C) 
 Like YouTube, SoundCloud needs to proactively identify and eliminate 
blatant and repeated infringement, which is already satisfied through the 
implementation of Audible Magic.  SoundCloud can address more egregious 
cases of potential infringement that bypass the technology by following § 
512(c)(1)(C)’s provisions for timely notice and takedown. 118  An examination 
of SoundCloud’s terms of use demonstrates strict adherence to the DMCA’s 
guidelines. The “reasonably implemented” requirement set forth under § 
512(i)(1)(A) should be satisfied, as SoundCloud’s notice and takedown 
procedures have been implement with the interests of rights holders as a 
paramount concern. 119 
 
Conclusion 
 
The potentially infringing material that exists on SoundCloud’s servers 
remains the primary concern for the company.  Without the assistance of 
copyright holders, the legality of potentially infringing material is difficult for 
SoundCloud, and other similar service providers, to unilaterally determine.  
According to the holding in YouTube, SoundCloud should be assured that their 
policies fully protect them against liability under the DMCA § 512(c) safe 
harbor.  In the interim, the implementation of Audible Magic should be an 
                                                        
118  Id. at 522. 
119  Raymer, supra note 42. 
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effective precautionary mechanism. 120  In the long term, the problem that 
SoundCloud faces is the reconciliation of their preventative measures with the 
original creative purpose of their innovative platform. 121 
                                                        
120  Mike Masnick, Permission Culture And The Automated Diminishment Of Fair Use, TECHDIRT 
(Dec. 27, 2010, 2:32 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20101227/09520712421/permission-
culture-automated-diminishment-fair-use.shtml. 
121  See Phil Morse, Why You Shouldn't Post Your Mixes On SoundCloud, DIGITAL DJ TIPS (Mar. 
11, 2011), http://www.digitaldjtips.com/2011/03/why-you-shouldnt-post-your-mixes-on-
soundcloud/ ("[M]ost of the material on SoundCloud of interest to DJs comprises DJ mixes or reworks, 
remakes and remixes that can't be found through official channels."). 
